






THE UNITED KINGDOM’S NEW OPT-OUT CLASS ACTION: THE UNIQUE PERSPECTIVE OF A ‘THIRD GENERATION’ STATUTE


A.   INTRODUCTION

Almost fifty years after opt-out class actions were introduced into the law of the United States,​[1]​ and almost a quarter of a century after their implementation in Australia​[2]​ and Canada,​[3]​ the legislature of the United Kingdom has (albeit somewhat more narrowly) followed suit. On 1 October 2015, an opt-out class action which is aimed at facilitating private actions for anti-competitive conduct was introduced, via a combination of the Consumer Rights Act 2015​[4]​ and supporting court rules​[5]​ (‘the CRA regime’). 

	At the time of writing, the case law is only just beginning.​[6]​ A little piece of English legal history was created on 31 March 2017, when the first class action certification decision was handed down by the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) — a seminal judgment, in Gibson v Pride Mobility Products Ltd (‘Mobility Scooters’).​[7]​ This article will examine this milestone in English jurisprudence, against the backdrop of the reforms which preceded it. 

The pathway of legislative reform which led to this point has been a ‘rocky road’. It took 20 years to progress from the first serious mention of opt-out implementation (by Lord Woolf, no less​[8]​) to the enactment of the 2015 Act.​[9]​ The intervening process involved several different Departmental recommendations; a ‘wash-up’ of pertinent legislation put back the reform by several years; even the final statute was threatened with an amendment which would have converted it to an exclusively opt-in regime; and at the very end, enactment was delayed by the entirely unrelated topic of ticket touting! This vignette of UK jurisprudence illustrates the adage that any reform is characterised by a collision between legal policy and the prevailing ‘political winds’ — with sometimes unpredictable results.

	The UK regime adopts an opt-in or opt-out approach to the formation of the class, depending upon judicial determination on a case-by-case basis.​[10]​ The regime contains the sort of features that one would expect in any opt-out class action. For example, class-wide aggregate damages will be possible — damages may be awarded ‘without undertaking an assessment of the amount of damages recoverable in respect of the claim of each represented person’.​[11]​ The class action also has full res judicata effect regarding the common issues, such that any judgment or settlement ‘is binding on all represented persons, except as otherwise specified’​[12]​ (where ‘represented persons’ are those who have not opted out).

	There are also many unique features of the new UK class action. For example, whereas the aforementioned US, Canadian and Australian class actions regime are ‘generic’ in nature (i.e., they are generally capable of dealing with any cause of action, from product liability to environmental claims, and from employment disputes to anti-competitive breaches),​[13]​ the new UK class action is sectoral only. Any grievance of the class must arise from an ‘infringement decision’ or ‘an alleged infringement’ of prohibitions on anti-competitive behaviour stipulated in either the Competition Act 1998 or the EU Treaty.​[14]​ Furthermore, any class member not domiciled in the UK must opt-in to opt-out class proceedings, in order to be included in the class action​[15]​ — an unusual feature of common law class actions jurisprudence which was implemented as a deliberate choice.​[16]​ Another unique aspect is that, where a judgment is given in the representative claimant’s favour, and an undistributed residue of an aggregate damages sum remains after individual class members have come forward, then those unclaimed damages must be paid to the Access to Justice Foundation​[17]​ (whereas, in the case of a settlement, they can be paid to any destination which forms part of the judicially-approved settlement, including cy-près distributions, reversion to the defendant, or other destination​[18]​). There is also a provision permitting part of the undistributed residue to be paid to the representative claimant ‘for costs and expenses incurred ... in connection with the proceedings’.​[19]​ These various features very much distinguish the UK class action from its progenitors. 

	The focus of analysis in this article is upon the authorisation (or ‘certification’) of the class action itself. The discussion herein will focus upon three important aspects, all of which arose in Mobility Scooters, viz, the degree of commonality required across the class of claimants; the type of representative claimant who may take the claim forth on the class’s behalf; and the preliminary merits of the case of which the court must be satisfied before it can certify the claim as a collective proceeding under the CRA regime.  These are discussed in Sections D, E and F, respectively. Prior to that critique, however, a short encapsulation of the tumultuous events and key moments in the law reform process are discussed in Section B,​[20]​ while Section C summarises the full certification matrix which was applied in Mobility Scooters. Section G concludes. 

B.   How the class action was implemented: a brief historical synopsis

Under the UK’s new competition law class actions regime, regardless of whether the claim is of a follow-on or stand-alone nature, it will be heard by the CAT, in which exclusive jurisdiction is vested.​[21]​

	Opt-out class action reform in the UK was two decades in the making.​[22]​ There was an ongoing and somewhat disjointed consideration of how to achieve an efficient and fair resolution of collective actions, which was undertaken by various entities (apart from the Law Commission of England and Wales, which has never considered the issue​[23]​). The modern impetus for opt-out class actions reform on the domestic front can be sourced to Lord Woolf’s Access to Justice report of 1996, wherein it was recommended that ‘[t]he court should have power to progress the multi-party situation on an “opt-out” or “opt-in” basis, whichever contributes best to the effective and efficient disposition of the case. In some circumstances, it will be appropriate to commence a multi-party situation on an “opt-out” basis, and to establish an “opt-in” register at a later stage’.​[24]​ There followed a series of Government Department policy papers — by the Lord Chancellor’s Department,​[25]​ the Department of Trade and Industry,​[26]​ the Office of Fair Trading,​[27]​ and the Patent Office.​[28]​

	At the same time, there was an increasing focus on collective redress at EU level, especially in the context of anti-competitive breaches​[29]​ and consumer law​[30]​ — although not, it must be emphasised, with any opt-out formation of the class in contemplation. Quite the reverse. Very few Member States at that time had opt-out regimes.​[31]​ The European Commission commented that the general consumer redress across the EU landscape was ‘not satisfactory’, especially when only 13 Member States had any judicial collective redress mechanisms at all.​[32]​

It was the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales’ (CJC’s) 2008 report entitled, Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions,​[33]​ which generated most impetus for the reform which eventually followed in the UK. Similarly to Lord Woolf over a decade earlier, and identically with the legislation which was ultimately enacted, the CJC recommended that collective claims ‘[should] be brought on an opt-in or opt-out basis, subject to court certification’.​[34]​ It based that view on various factors, including an earlier empirical study which, from ‘looking inwards’ and ‘looking outwards’, showed evidence of need for an additional form of redress.​[35]​ However, whereas the CJC had recommended that, for several reasons, a generic collective action should be introduced,​[36]​ what eventuated was sectoral reform. 

In that respect, the die was cast very early in the reform process. In its formal response to the CJC’s recommendations,​[37]​ the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) accepted that there was a place for collective actions brought on an opt-out basis, but it categorically rejected the generic approach. Instead, ‘the Government considers that the only practical way forward is on a sector by sector basis’.​[38]​ Two reasons were given: there were so-called ‘structural differences’ among sectors; and a ‘meaningful global impact [economic and other] assessment’ of the reform ‘would be virtually impossible’.​[39]​ Albeit that both grounds are contestable (and were entirely flawed, in this author’s opinion​[40]​), the pathway of sectoral reform in the UK was firmly set thereafter.

	There were some ‘false starts’ — notably, a Bill to promulgate a class action for financial services claims,​[41]​ arising from a Treasury Department recommendation,​[42]​ and with detailed supporting court rules​[43]​ — before the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills developed a consultation for class actions in the competition law field in 2012.​[44]​ The Government response to that consultation, published in January 2013,​[45]​ ultimately paved the way for the enactment of 2015’s CRA regime.  

	This groundbreaking legislative reform was contained in Schedule 8 of the Consumer Rights Bill (in a section entitled, ‘Private Actions in Competition Law’), and was introduced into Parliament on 23 January 2014.​[46]​ The relevant provisions were subject to extensive Parliamentary debate.​[47]​ It is interesting to record, for the sake of posterity, that at one point during the Bill’s passage, it was proposed that the regime should become an opt-in regime only,​[48]​ so that the definition of an ‘opt-out collective proceeding’ would be entirely deleted, and ‘opt-in collective proceedings’ would become the sole definition of a collective proceedings. However, ultimately those amendments were not moved.​[49]​ Meanwhile, a public review of the new set of draft CAT Rules​[50]​ was conducted simultaneously.​[51]​ Towards the end of the Parliamentary term, during the ‘ping pong’ stage of the Bill’s passage, Parliament had to obtain a grant, on 21 January 2015, for an extension of the debate of the Bill; otherwise it would have lapsed.​[52]​ The debate was being ‘strung out’ by issues concerning ticket touting and secondary ticketing platforms, which the wide-ranging Bill also encompassed.​[53]​ Ultimately, the Consumer Rights Act (including Schedule 8) received Royal Assent on 26 March 2015, and the competition law class action came into effect six months later, on 1 October 2015. 

	Parallel developments were occurring at EU level too. On 11 June 2013, the European Commission published its Recommendation on Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted under Union Law.​[54]​ Ultimately, there were significant divergences between this Recommendation and the legislative drafting choices which the UK adopted for its class action. Most notably, the EC preferred the formation of a class of ‘natural or legal persons’ based upon their formal consent (i.e, via an ‘opt-in’ approach), and that ‘[a]ny exception to this principle, by law or by court order, should be duly justified by reasons of sound administration of justice’.​[55]​ It also preferred the sole use of an ideological claimant​[56]​ (which clearly the CRA regime does not). Albeit that these divergences are not the focus of this article,​[57]​ the UK Parliament was justifiably not prepared to countenance the EC’s vision of collective redress in its entirety.

C.  The certification criteria for the new regime

The CAT must make a ‘collective proceedings order’, for any class action for a stand-alone or follow-on competition law claim to proceed.​[58]​ This certification process amounts to a formal hearing at an early stage of the litigation to determine whether the legislative threshold requirements for the progress of the action as a collective action are met. As with the opt-out regimes in Canada and the United States,​[59]​ formal certification is firmly embodied in the new CRA regime. This was a deliberate policy decision.​[60]​ It is a class action ‘with brakes’ — and how effective those brakes are depends entirely on the manner in which the certification requirements are drafted, and then judicially interpreted.





TABLE A    Certification criteria under the new UK Class Action
1.	Commonality — class members must have claims that ‘raise common issues’,​[62]​ where ‘common issues’ means ‘the same, similar or related issues of fact or law’​[63]​
2.	Superiority to other means of resolving the dispute — two are specified: it must be ‘an appropriate means for the fair and efficient resolution of the common issues’;​[64]​ andthe CAT must consider ‘the availability of ADR and any other means of resolving the dispute’​[65]​
3.	Minimum numerosity — none is specified – but:there must be ‘an identifiable class of persons’;​[66]​ the CAT is also required to consider ‘the size of the class’​[67]​
4.	Preliminary merits — two are specified: the representative claimant ‘believes that the claims ... have a real prospect of success’;​[68]​more indirectly, when selecting opt-in and opt-out, the CAT shall consider ‘the strength of the claims’​[69]​
5.	Cost–benefit criterion — two are mentioned: the CAT will take into account ‘the costs and the benefits of continuing the collective proceedings’;​[70]​ more indirectly, when deciding between opt-in and opt-out, the CAT shall consider ‘the estimated amount of damages that individual class members may recover’​[71]​
6.	An adequate class definition — the CAT must be satisfied that the claims sought to be included in the collective proceedings ‘are brought on behalf of an identifiable class of persons’​[72]​
7.	Need — the CAT must take into account ‘whether any separate proceedings making claims of the same or a similar nature have already been commenced by members of the class’​[73]​
8.	General suitability — several are specified: class members’ claims must be ‘suitable to be brought in collective proceedings’;​[74]​the CAT must consider ‘whether it is possible to determine for any person whether he is or is not a member of the class’;​[75]​the CAT must take into account ‘whether the claims are suitable for an aggregate award of damages’​[76]​
9.	Representative claimant — various criteria will apply to this party, consisting of:re general adequacy, it must be ‘just and reasonable’ that that person acts as a representative,​[77]​ and that the representative would ‘fairly and adequately act in the interests of the class members’;​[78]​re financial adequacy, the representative must be ‘able to pay the defendant’s recoverable costs if ordered’,​[79]​ or satisfy any undertaking as to damages re injunctive relief;​[80]​no conflicts of ‘material interests’ between the representative and the class members;​[81]​ if the representative is a class member, his ‘suitability to manage the proceedings’;​[82]​ if the representative is not a class member, then ‘whether it is a pre-existing body and the nature and functions of that body’;​[83]​having a plan for the collective proceedings which is satisfactory.​[84]​

Of course, the primary objective of a de jure certification regime is to prevent ‘floodgates’ concerns about class actions going forth. As such, it may become the ‘chief battleground’ of class actions disputes (as one Canadian judge has called it​[85]​).

	This certification matrix has been considered for the first time in Mobility Scooters — as mentioned in the Introduction, a truly historical moment in English jurisprudence. The case concerned the resale price maintenance of certain models of Pride mobility scooters. Proven infringements​[86]​ of the Competition Act, Chapter I, were found by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), by decision dated 27 March 2014, against Pride Mobility Products Ltd (‘Pride’), covering the period of purchases between February 2010 and February 2012. Hence, this was a follow-on collective proceeding, based upon that OFT decision.​[87]​ Pride was the largest supplier of mobility scooters in the UK at the time of the infringing behaviour, and was found to have entered into either bilateral agreements or concerted practices with eight independent retailers (‘the Retailers’), whereby those Retailers would not advertise seven models of Pride scooters online at prices below the recommended retail price set by Pride.​[88]​  The OFT also found that the infringements had an effect on raising prices for consumers. This was a consumer-only collective proceeding, the class definition explicitly excluding those who had purchased a Pride mobility scooter in the course of a business.​[89]​ 

	As an important preliminary point, the CAT noted​[90]​ that the US approach to certification — involving as it does, extensive disclosure, cross-examination of witnesses, depositions, and different certification criteria (e.g., a requirement of predominance of the common issues) — was of only ‘limited assistance’, when it came to interpreting the requirements of the new CRA regime. Rather, said the CAT, the Canadian approach to certification, being less onerous, was more helpful, sharing similarities with how the procedural requirements of certification should be interpreted under the UK regime.​[91]​ Although the CAT’s portrayal of the Canadian regimes as not being of ‘the pattern prevailing in the United States’ is correct in some respects, it is not true the Canadian regimes replicate the simpler position under the CRA regime.  For example, depositions are permitted in Canadian class actions jurisprudence,​[92]​ and in some provinces, a predominance requirement is expressly legislated for.​[93]​ Nevertheless, the CAT’s statements are an important indicator that Canadian jurisprudence will be particularly relevant in future interpretative decisions under the CRA regime. 

	Of the CRA’s certification matrix, a few were either disposed of easily, or not considered explicitly at all, in Mobility Scooters. The numerosity criterion, for example, was not in issue. The representative claimant and the defendant were in dispute about how the class should be defined, a topic discussed next in Section D. Nevertheless, on either scenario, the consumer class members were plentiful: 27,000–32,000 according to the representative claimant, and 944 according to the defendant.​[94]​ The suitability criteria were also met quite easily in this case, to the extent that, ‘[g]iven the size and nature of the class, and the amount of loss allegedly suffered by individuals, it is not suggested that it would be cost-efficient or reasonable for the claims to be brought other than by way of collective proceedings. … To that extent, therefore, the suitability condition does not require further, independent consideration.’​[95]​ 

The superiority criteria, and the need criterion, noted in the matrix above, were not explicitly considered in Mobility Scooters at all. This is quite interesting, notably because superiority has assumed such a prominent role in certification analyses in competition law cases elsewhere.​[96]​ It is evident that other certification criteria in the CRA regime assumed a greater importance in Mobility Scooters — and did the work to ‘brake’ the collective proceedings, at least temporarily, there. It was commonality and class definition which posed particular problems for the class, as discussed in the next section.  

D.  COMMONALITY AND CLASS DEFINITION: THE CHALLENGES

The crux of the difficulties arising for the representative claimant, Ms Gibson, concerned the definition of the class, and the common issues that were shared by the class members. The ultimate outcome of the certification judgment in Mobility Scooters was that Ms Gibson and her lawyers should be given the opportunity to revise their claim form, to redefine the class, and to adduce further expert evidence about the aggregate assessment of damages which may be claimed in the collective proceeding.

	In a nutshell, the problem was this: the class was defined as ‘any person who purchased a Pride mobility scooter other than in the course of a business in the UK between 1 February 2010 and 29 February 2012’.​[97]​  However, the OFT’s decision on infringement only concerned eight retailers, and seven models of Pride scooters. There were some 250–300 other retailers who sold Pride scooters, and there were 31 other models of Pride scooters, which were not the subject of the OFT’s infringement  decision. The representative claimant argued that Pride had a policy of resale price maintenance which was market-wide, and that the OFT had simply concentrated on those particular models and retailers, as ‘low-hanging evidential fruit’.​[98]​ 

However, the CAT disagreed with this approach, noting that as a follow-on claim, the question for the collective proceeding had to be what loss flowed to the class from those infringements, and not from Pride’s policy.  Otherwise, any market-wide claim for loss would include not only consumers who bought from those eight retailers, but also, consumers who bought their scooters from retailers other than those eight (who had not been found to have participated in infringing behaviour), as well as those consumers who purchased from retailers who may have participated in unlawful behavior but whose claims were now time-barred.  It would have meant that the aggregate damages across the class would have been the same, whether one retailer, eight retailers, or all 300 retailers, had been found liable for anti-competitive conduct.  As the CAT said (surely correctly, in this author’s view), ‘[t]hat cannot be right’.​[99]​ The follow-on action had to relate to the actual infringements found in the OFT decision upon which the collective proceeding was based. 

This means that the class needs to be redefined, to encompass only those particular consumers who purchased their relevant model from the relevant retailer (944 sales, according to the defendant, with only 260 of those estimated to be online sales, the subject of the infringement decision​[100]​), and the aggregate assessment of damages will also require revision. 

Once the class is redefined, there will, of course, be no difficulty in determining whether or not the consumer fell within the class, as the CRA regime requires;​[101]​ and the class will also be an ‘identifiable class of persons’.​[102]​ However, the potential effects of all this upon the various preliminary merits criteria are considered later, in Section F.  

The proof of a class-wide aggregate damage, as a ‘same, similar or related issue of fact or law’,​[103]​ will also be contentious. Canadian jurisprudence shows a real division of outcome about the requisite ‘common issue’. The CAT itself referred to a Canadian case which authorised the use of expert evidence to calculate class-wide damages, where ‘the methodology cannot be purely theoretical or hypothetical, but must be grounded in the facts of the particular case is question.’​[104]​ Other cases have been similarly supportive: that aggregate damages on a class-wide basis based upon a ‘narrowed class’, as a common issue, was possible in resale price maintenance cases,​[105]​ and was not necessarily ‘inherently unsuitable for a class proceeding’ in such a case.​[106]​ However, other Canadian courts have had real misgivings, because the economic models relied upon by the class to prove damage as a class-wide issue have been unworkable, infeasible, or based upon erroneous or unfounded assumptions;​[107]​ or causation of individual damage has meant that ‘questions of fact or law, other than those relating to the assessment of monetary relief, remain to be determined in order to establish the amount of the defendant’s liability’.​[108]​  Proof of class-wide damages as a common issue will be a crucial question for the Mobility Scooters claim, going forward.

The requisite tie between the follow-on action, and the original OFT decision, as established by the CAT in Mobility Scooters, has narrowed this collective proceedings considerably, and that precedent will undoubtedly be of real importance, when representative claimants bring cases under the CRA regime in the future.  

e.   THE IDEOLOGICAL CLAIMANT: DRAFTING AND APPLICATION

Under the CRA regime, standing to sue is widely cast. The representative claimant may be either a directly-affected class member, or an ‘ideological claimant’, i.e., one who does not itself have a direct cause of action, but which is considered to be a ‘suitable representative’.​[109]​ The class action is capable of being brought by either, provided that ‘it is just and reasonable for the applicant to act as a class representative in the collective proceedings’.​[110]​

	In the Mobility Scooters case, an ‘ideological claimant’ was deployed. The class representative, Dorothy Gibson, is the General Secretary of the National Pensioners Convention (NPC), which was described​[111]​ as ‘an umbrella organisation for around 1,000 pensioner groups across the UK that campaigns about issues of concern to older people’. It was pleaded that ‘the NPC has had an interest in issues connected with mobility scooters since 2013', and that, as representative of the class of consumers, ‘Ms Gibson will carry out her duties with support and assistance of the NPC and an experienced legal team’. However, Ms Gibson herself does not have a direct cause of action for loss arising from the infringements, as she never purchased a mobility scooter herself.​[112]​

	The CAT was satisfied, in the certification judgment, that it was ‘just and reasonable’ for Ms Gibson to act as class representative.​[113]​ As Table A shows, the legislation provides the CAT with several criteria against which to assess that, including that: the representative ‘would fairly and adequately act in the class members’ interests;’ there was no conflicts of interest with the class members on the common issues; and the representative would be able to pay any order for the defendant’s recoverable costs.​[114]​ Ms Gibson was able to meet all of these. She was an ‘experienced campaigner’; regularly met with policy makers to discuss issues concerning pensioners; had liaised with her solicitors and attended the relevant CAT hearings throughout; and was assessed by the CAT to be able to understand the contested issues of fact and law in the case.​[115]​ It was noted that third party funders,​[116]​ and an ATE policy, were in place to cover both adverse costs (up to £1.08 million) and Ms Gibson’s own disbursements, if the claim was lost.​[117]​ Even though Pride’s (the defendant’s) costs budget totaled approximately £1.4 million, the CAT was satisfied that Ms Gibson’s arrangements for paying any adverse costs were reasonable, given that: (1) ‘Pride’s recoverable costs would generally be limited to what is reasonable and proportionate’; (2) Pride had already done much of its defence work during the OFT’s investigations; and (3) the class’s own budgeted costs totaled under £1 million, and it was ‘not evident’ why Pride’s costs should exceed that figure.​[118]​

	It is worth noting (especially given the CAT’s declared affinity, in Mobility Scooters, for Canadian precedent) that the CAT regime does not expressly encompass all of the characteristics which Canadian jurisprudence has revealed to be desirable for the ideological claimant​[119]​ — and, inevitably, the cross-fertilisation of jurisprudence which comparative law affords is potentially very useful. Indeed, in Canada over recent years, the attempt to use ideological claimants has been something of a ‘mixed bag’. In Alberta, a condominium corporation was permitted to act on behalf of unitholders, in Condominium Plan No 0020701 v Investplan Properties Inc;​[120]​ and in Elder Advocates of Alberta Socy v Alberta,​[121]​ an individual, Mr Darwish, and the named Society, were permitted to act on behalf of a vulnerable group of elders who were claiming for improper overcharges whilst in long-term care facilities. In British Columbia, in Dominguez v Northland Properties Corp,​[122]​ an individual (who herself had a cause of action) could also be appointed as an appropriate representative for a class of vulnerable foreign workers in Canada. By contrast, in Alberta Municipal Retired Police Officers’ Mutual Benefit Socy v Alberta,​[123]​ the named Society sought to represent police officers in a dispute regarding benefits received under police pension plans, but was considered not to be an appropriate ideological claimant.​[124]​





TABLE B   A potential judicial checklist for the ideological claimant — that he/she/it:
does not have a direct financial interest in the proceedings – there was no direct reference to this in Mobility Scooters, but it was presumed, given Ms Gibson’s status as General Secretary of the NPC;has demonstrated a willingness to seek instructions from class members where required, and to keep the class members informed of key developments in the action – Ms Gibson regularly reported on the case’s  progress to the NPC’s National Council and Executive Committee, and was accepted by the members as being the NPC’s ‘public face’;has retained competent and experienced lawyers to represent the class – the qualifications of Leigh Day, and counsel, to conduct this litigation on the class’s behalf were addressed, and found to be ‘extensive’ and ‘experienced’; has adequately participated in the course of the litigation, leading up to the certification hearing – Ms Gibson’s numerous meetings with her solicitors, and attendance at all hearings, were noted by the CAT; has demonstrated a willingness to undertake evidence-gathering responsibilities on the class’s behalf – a litigation plan prepared by Ms Gibson, covering disclosure and likely evidence, were approved;has no conflict of interest with the class members on the common issues - an express criterion, and met;has demonstrated that it has adequate financial resources to pursue the matter, and cover adverse costs – an express criterion, and met;has demonstrated an ability to be discovered/offer disclosure on matters having to do with the class — and/or it is willing to select an individual class member who can address those disclosure requirements – see reference to the litigation plan, noted above; has demonstrated that, without its intervention, a class of vulnerable people would, or may, go unrepresented, because of a manifest unwillingness of any class member to prosecute the action – Ms Gibson referred to the class of vulnerable people who use mobility scooters, either the elderly or disabled;as an entity, has been in existence for some time, and not merely formed for the purposes of the litigation – Ms Gibson noted the NPC’s concern over mobility scooter pricing, as discussed in the press, well before this litigation was commenced; has demonstrated that it has sufficient knowledge of the history of the litigation to assist the class lawyers with the conduct of the litigation (and that its appointment would not protract the litigation) – the NPC’s involvement in the litigation on the basis that, ‘unless we or some other organization acts, Pride will provide them with no redress’ following the OFT’s finding of infringements, was noted.

Hence, the application of  the ‘ideological claimant’ provision was relatively straightforward in Mobility Scooters.  

However, before leaving this section, it is worth noting that, from a drafting point of view, the permissibility of Ms Gibson to be put forward as representative claimant, as an alternative to a directly-affected class member, is quite different from the standing rules which apply in the federal regimes of the United States and Australia, and in the provincial regimes of Canada. This is an important vignette of just how the UK’s law-makers were able to draw upon class actions jurisprudence elsewhere, plus to learn from previous unsatisfactory domestic law, to draft these rules.  There are several reasons dictating against the use of ‘ideological claimants’ — not least that it is an important exception to the general rule that a claimant must possess a cause of action in order to sue, in circumstances where collective redress already deviates from traditional litigation.​[125]​ Hence, widening the capacity to sue, to include them, is a controversial design feature — but it was necessary, given that the pursuit of class actions by ‘trade associations’ and ‘consumer associations’ as representative parties was specifically endorsed by the Government during reform discussions.​[126]​

The ‘either/or’ choice permitted by the UK law-makers, as between a class member or an ideological claimant, had already been preferred in the aborted 2010 reforms for the Financial Services Bill regime,​[127]​ which contained an opt-out collective action for ‘financial services claims’. The CRA regime carries through the same ethos.​[128]​ In so doing, it successfully avoids the difficulties which have pervaded regimes elsewhere, where various other legislative options have been employed, viz: 

(i)	the regime may be taken to permit the use of an ‘ideological claimant’ — even though that approach it is not explicitly permitted on the face of the legislation (as has occurred, with some considerable legal skirmishing, under the US​[129]​ and Australian federal opt-out regimes​[130]​); 

(ii)	the regime may only permit an ideological claimant as the exceptional option, so that the directly-affected class member should be the default choice (an option preferred by numerous Canadian regimes​[131]​); 

(iii)	the ‘ideological claimant’ may be the only possible representative claimant in some regimes — an option which was never realistically going to be incorporated within the CRA 2015, given the extremely chequered history of the now-repealed s 47B opt-in collective action in the Competition Act 1998.​[132]​ That follow-on representative proceeding was capable of being brought by a ‘specified body’, in respect of ‘consumer claims made or continued on behalf of at least two individuals’.​[133]​ The whole episode was a most restrictive, and unpromising, example of collective redress (the many problems of which have been described elsewhere​[134]​). Only one specified body was ever legislatively nominated: the English Consumers’ Association, Which?​[135]​ — and during the entirety of the regime’s enactment, a grand total of one case was brought under it, viz, Consumers Association v JJB Sports plc, in respect of price-fixed replica football shirts.​[136]​ Which? itself went on record as stating that it was not inclined to bring any further action, given the frontloading and expensive work that an opt-in regime required, and that the requirement to identify and name all claimants on the claim form was ‘[t]he single biggest hurdle’ to the efficacy of the regime.​[137]​  The futility of this s 47B regime was a key prompt for the Government’s decision to enact 2015’s CRA regime.​[138]​ Ultimately, using an ideological claimant as the ‘sole representative’ was destined to fail in the 2015 reform, for legal and historical reasons; 

(iv)	the fourth option is a ‘barring’ provision which prohibits certain ideological claimants from acting as representative claimants. Such a provision was certainly considered by the Working Group which prepared draft rules of court for the anticipated enactment of the Financial Services Bill 2010 — especially whether it was worth barring law firms, third party funders, and special-purpose-vehicles (SPVs) from seeking authorisation as a ‘suitable representative’. Ultimately, the Working Group decided against a barring provision: ‘[f]irst, it was decided that whatever formulation was used, the representative would always be able to find a way of getting round the criteria. Secondly, any chosen formulation was likely to be open to different interpretations, and would therefore give rise to litigation over its meaning.’​[139]​ Ultimately, the UK Government’s policy view was that the abovementioned entities should not be allowed to act as representative claimants under the CRA regime​[140]​ — and although not expressly provided for in either the CRA 2015 or in the CAT Rules, the certification criteria would surely exclude any such entity from consideration. Interestingly, one of the amendments proposed before the Public Bills Committee (Lords) — ‘[a] person may not be authorised if they have a direct financial interest in the proceedings, other than as a claimant’​[141]​ — would definitely have prevented a law firm or funder from so acting, if operating under a CFA or a hybrid DBA​[142]​ respectively, but this barring provision was not enacted. Nevertheless, it will be recalled that the CAT must consider whether the representative is ‘a pre-existing body, and the nature and functions of that body’.​[143]​ This criterion will likely also bar: alternative business structures with a connection to the claimant law firm; an individual who is ‘related to’ one of the class members, whether by business or familial connection, but who does not have a cause of action himself/herself; or a ‘busy body’ or ‘professional litigator’.

The preceding discussion illustrates and supports why the ‘either/or’ approach — as between a directly-affected class member and an ideological claimant — was the drafting choice adopted under the CRA regime. It was a law reform lesson in learning from others’ experiences. Of course, it is not unions, trade associations, consumer associations, or representatives such as Ms Gibson, which may be troublesome ‘ideological claimants’. They will likely have the purposes, resources, and knowledge, to prosecute a class action fairly and adequately. Other entities or natural persons in later cases may pose entirely different considerations under the CRA regime, however.   

The final substantive part of this article will deal with the preliminary merits criteria which the representative claimant will need to meet under the CRA regime. The CAT made several interesting observations about these criteria in Mobility Scooters, emphasizing that these aspects of the certification matrix are both important and challenging. 

f.   The preliminary merits of the action: The UK’s unique approach





Class actions litigation is not the same as other litigation.​[145]​ It is highly consumptive of resources (for both the court and for litigants). The disclosure on the common issues may be expensive and wide-ranging​[146]​ — and notably, in Mobility Scooters, the CAT also foreshadowed permitting ‘limited orders for third party disclosure’​[147]​ to help re-define the common issues. The funding arrangements will often be complex (and may, themselves, generate litigation).​[148]​ The various communications to the class members designed to protect their interests, which are legislatively-prescribed,​[149]​ are necessarily rigorous. Certification battles must be prepared for — and either a trial, or (more likely) a settlement which achieves the approval of the court as being ‘just and reasonable’​[150]​ (and which survives the objections of class members​[151]​), will lie in the future. Individual issues may then need to be assessed. 

	Of course, any class action brought in the CAT will have to meet the usual threshold of showing a ‘reasonable cause of action’,​[152]​ to prevent any notion of its being a vexatious or frivolous suit which will be struck out. The options for default judgment,​[153]​ and summary judgment,​[154]​ will also be possible. The preliminary merits criteria discussed in this section are additional to those, and raise that threshold considerably. What they are particularly targeting are cases which are weak, but not so weak that they could be struck out. 

Other class actions jurisdictions have not been as bold as the UK law-makers, regarding preliminary merits criteria.​[155]​ Most of them have eschewed any such provisions, although ‘rumblings to the contrary persist, both by the judiciary and by law reformers’ in those jurisdictions.​[156]​ It has all been a most uneven landscape elsewhere. 

Given that the CAT has endorsed the Canadian approach to certification in the Mobility Scooters judgment, and considered aspects of that jurisprudence to be ‘helpful’ and ‘appropriate’,​[157]​ it may be of interest to note the Canadian approach to preliminary merits. This aspect (and the Canadian case law noted below) was not referred to in the CAT’s judgment, but in this author’s opinion, it reflects the approach to merits that the CRA regime should appropriately apply.  In Ontario (and followed elsewhere in Canadian provincial regimes​[158]​), the legislation expressly says that the merits of the claim do not matter. According to the Class Proceedings Act 1992, ‘[a]n order certifying a class proceeding is not a determination of the merits of the proceeding.’​[159]​ However, they actually do matter — somewhat. Recently, in the 2016 case of Warner v Smith & Nephew Inc, the Alberta Court of Appeal noted the longstanding view in Canadian regimes that, ‘class certification is not a trial, nor is it a summary judgment application. It does not involve a consideration of the claim on its merits. It is “a procedural motion which concerns the form of an action, not its merits”.’​[160]​ However, the Court (which had to consider allegedly defective hip implants which caused toxic heavy metal levels in the patients’ blood) considered​[161]​ that early Canadian class action jurisprudence ‘under-emphasized a review of the merits during the certification process’ — whereas, in reality, ‘a consideration of the merits could indirectly become relevant during some parts of the analysis’ of the commonality and superiority certification criteria (and whether a class actually exists). The Court stated that ‘it is worth reaffirming the importance of certification as a meaningful screening device.’ Notably, though, ‘what is not required is some sort of proof of the claim on the “balance of probabilities”’; and the ‘some basis in fact’ standard ‘does not require that the court resolve conflicting facts and evidence at the certification stage.’ The Court of Appeal concluded that, in Canada, ‘the certification application is still heavily focused on whether the procedure is appropriate. It is not a place for a “robust” analysis of the merits, nor the resolution of disputed factual issues, and any in-depth weighing of the evidence is inappropriate. The test of the merits on certification is a very low standard, but it must amount to more than symbolic scrutiny. ... the certification judge gave too much weight to the prospective merits of the action, by suggesting that the representative plaintiff had to demonstrate, at the certification stage, a defect in the Birmingham System, or an alternative better design. That analysis extended beyond the limited review of the merits that is permitted in law.’

	The CAT’s insistence, in Mobility Scooters, that ‘the US approach to certification of common issues for the purpose of class actions is of limited assistance’,​[162]​ should be of particular note, where merits assessment is concerned.  FRCP 23 is silent on the topic — but the preliminary merits of the claim do matter there, judicially speaking. It may have been said by the US Supreme Court, in Eisen v Carlisle and Jacquelin, that ‘[w]e find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary enquiry into the merits of a suit, in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action’​[163]​ — but the reality has not quite turned out that way. Some US courts have suggested that a reasonably detailed preliminary merits enquiry is sometimes necessary to determine certification.​[164]​ Indeed, it was noted, in Warner, that, ‘Canadian courts have resisted the US approach of engaging in a robust analysis of the merits at the certification stage.’​[165]​ 

	Hence, it is submitted by the author that the CAT’s preference for the Canadian approach to certification generally will be particularly important in the merits assessments which it undertakes in cases to come. 

	As already stated, the UK legislators went far further than any of the Australian, Canadian or US regimes, when drafting preliminary merits criteria. As Table A shows, there are four which apply.​[166]​ Their treatment in Mobility Scooters is of real interest, for this and for future cases under the CRA regime. 

2.	The preliminary merits criteria in the CRA regime

The strength of the merits of the claim

It will be recalled that, when deciding between opt-in and opt-out, the CAT shall consider ‘the strength of the claims’.​[167]​ Presumably (although the CRA regime does not state this), stronger merits will be required for an opt-out action, to warrant the greater resources which such an action may require, if the class is large (or even extremely large), in the context of competition law claims.

	The CAT addressed this in Mobility Scooters fairly briefly. Specifically, the criterion ‘did not require a full merits assessment, but rather, a high level view of the strength of the claims’.​[168]​ Instructively for follow-on actions, the CAT considered that the criterion was met, because (1) the violation of competition law had already been established, and (2) the OFT’s decision that the resale price maintenance infringements had an effect on the prices which consumers paid for their mobility scooters ‘shows that the claim for loss cannot be dismissed as weak.’​[169]​

	These observations do not shed much light on how that criterion will be met in stand-alone cases, however. Does it mean that the representative claimant must prove an American Cyanamid-type assessment that there is ‘a serious question to be tried’?​[170]​ Or that the claim has 'a real prospect of success'? Or that the representative claimant can prove any disputes in fact or in law in his favour on the balance of probabilities? It will be recalled​[171]​ that the Alberta Court of Appeal in Warner did not endorse a ‘balance of probabilities’ assessment for its jurisdiction — and nor is the CAT likely to do so for stand-alone actions brought under the CRA regime. The difficulty with a ‘strength of the claims’ criterion is that the substantive area of law being litigated in the class action may well raise novel issues, and may involve areas where the law is not fully settled. For example, the application of the passing-on defence to a class action is yet to be determined in the UK at the time of writing, and a recent judgment on the topic of passing-on​[172]​ has been noted in commentary to leave some questions unanswered.​[173]​ Whether or not such a criterion applies, it is submitted that these matters should not preclude certification — as they do not under the Canadian regimes (as recently noted​[174]​). 





The criterion in the CRA regime — that the CAT will take into account ‘the costs and the benefits of continuing the collective proceedings’​[175]​ — will potentially be a very important ‘brake’ on the continuation of the collective proceedings. The burning question will be: ‘the costs to whom?’; and the ‘benefits to whom?’. The legislation does not specify. 	

Table C notes some interpretations which could be relevant, on each side of the ‘equation’: 

TABLE C     The possible ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ under the CRA regime:
The costs could feasibly mean: 	The benefits, to be offset, could feasibly mean: 
the costs to the litigants themselves (i.e., the representative claimant, and the defendant); the burdens on the CAT, in light of the judicial time and resources that will be required to manage the litigation;the costs to the individual class members, given what efforts will be required on their part, say, to come forward and prove their individual issues, or what funding arrangements will be borne by those class members, should the class win on the common issues; the costs to the defendant of identifying and distributing the monetary sums to which the class members were entitled, should the class action prevail on the common issues;the burdens upon the public if the class action should progress (e.g., by bringing about an unsatisfactory substantive change or distortion in the law); ora combination of any of the above? 	the benefits to the litigants (i.e., to the representative claimant, whether via monetary redress or other benefits, such as reputational enhancement, and to the defendant, if an alleged wrongdoing is found to be entirely lawful and without legal merit); the benefits of judicial economy which a class action would bring to the CAT;the benefits to the individual class members in terms of the individual relief which each would obtain, should the class action succeed (i.e., whether it would be de minimis recovery, or something more);the benefits to the public, should anti-competitive behaviour be deterred or tempered by an award of widespread redress, or should a cy-près distribution be foreshadowed as part of settlement discussions;the benefits to the Access to Justice Foundation, if a judgment is entered, and the amount of recovery per class member is very, very low, rendering it unlikely that there will be a 100% take-up by individual class members; ora combination of any of the above?

Hence, the costs–benefit criterion under the CRA regime is very widely-drafted. It provides the CAT with maximum flexibility — with residual uncertainty for relevant litigants, by corollary, until some ‘flesh’ is attributed to the legislative ‘bones’. It will be crucial, in the first few certification cases, that the CAT explain clearly the issues which will form part of that costs–benefit matrix. 

	In Mobility Scooters, the limited discussion of this criterion suggests that it is the costs and benefits to the litigants themselves, and the potential benefits to the class members, which the CAT considers to be relevant. Once the class is redefined, it is possible (likely?) that any aggregate assessment of damages will reduce, especially if the class size is only approximately 950 consumers, as Pride has suggested in its evidence at the certification hearing. In those circumstances, Pride submitted that the action ‘would involve very substantial costs for what … could only be very small damages’ — and the CAT agreed that the question ‘may need further consideration’, once the class was redefined and a revised assessment of damages was undertaken.​[176]​ Nothing wider than that was discussed by the CAT as being relevant under the CRA’s cost–benefit criterion.

	Interestingly, a similar widely-drafted criterion to the CRA’s provision was suggested in the draft court rules which were proposed for the ‘washed-up’ regime in the Financial Services Bill.​[177]​ The Working Group noted there that ‘[t]he wording is deliberately broad to permit the court to take into account not only the particular costs and benefits of the court case itself, but also the broader costs and benefits to society of any collective proceedings’.​[178]​ Indeed, that approach reflected that of the Ontario Law Reform Commission (OLRC), which proposed that a court could ‘refuse to certify the action as a class action, if, in the opinion of the court, the adverse effects of the proceedings upon the class, the courts or the public, would outweigh the benefits to the class, the courts or the public that might be secured if the action were certified.’​[179]​ It was deliberately envisaged to permit the court to ‘conduct a wide-ranging inquiry with respect to the purposes of the action, the costs of litigating it, and the benefit that are likely to result from its successful prosecution’.​[180]​ Whilst declining to set any statutory set of guidelines, the OLRC suggested, as an example of a ‘cost’ of a class action to the public, ‘the possible distortion of the substantive law that might result from a particular class action’.​[181]​ However, the provision was never enacted. The lesson of this law reform proposal is that it is certainly within the CAT’s discretion to consider the wide-ranging factors which the OLRC mentioned, under the CRA’s costs–benefit criterion. If that is how it is to be judicially ‘fleshed out’, however, then that will need to be articulated as early as possible in the jurisprudence which emanates under the CRA regime — not least because the evidence required to be adduced by the representative claimant, to prove that the claim is ‘worth it’, will depend entirely upon what ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ the CAT determines will be needed to be offset, in the class’s favour. 

It is also worth noting that, if any costs to the defendant are to be relevant to the criterion under the CRA regime, then a key lesson​[182]​ from the explicit cost–benefit test in the Australian federal class actions regime (in s 33M​[183]​) is this: in the vitamins price-fixing litigation in Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd,​[184]​ the Australian Federal Court considered that the application to discontinue the class action under s 33M must fail, because it was too early to discontinue on that ground — e.g., how does one determine the costs to the defendant of identifying and distributing the compensation to individual class members, when the number of class members is probably not known at the point of certification? Merkel J commented that, ‘having regard to the magnitude of the fines already imposed in respect of one aspect of the cartel arrangement in Australia, it is likely that the amount of damages that is being claimed will be considerable. In the circumstances, the Australian subsidiaries have not established that the cost of distributing damages is likely to be excessive as required by s 33M’, and in any event, ‘I am not satisfied that I should exercise my discretion under 33M at this early stage.’​[185]​ 
 
	Hence, the first certification judgment in Mobility Scooters has not shed much light on the CRA’s costs–benefit criterion, but clearly, several of the factors in Table C may still become relevant to that criterion. Out of fairness to future litigants, the CAT will need to be very clear as to how it interprets that criterion. 

A minimum threshold amount of individual claims

The CRA regime provides that, when deciding between opt-in and opt-out, the CAT shall consider ‘whether it is practicable for the proceedings to be brought as opt-in collective proceedings, having regard to ... the estimated amount of damages that individual class members may recover’.​[186]​ Presumably, large individual claims may favourably dispose the court to an opt-in regime — that such claims would be individually worth pursuing — whereas the small overcharge-per-person would suit an opt-out action. That is, at least, the implication of the section. 

	In Mobility Scooters, the amount of individual loss per consumer class member was stated to be in the region of £40 to £195, depending upon the type of Pride mobility scooter purchased.​[187]​ The CAT addressed this criterion​[188]​ by noting that the amount of loss allegedly suffered by each class member meant that it was ‘reasonable’ for the claims be brought by way of opt-out collective proceedings, and that it was not suggested otherwise.​[189]​ 

Undoubtedly, this CRA provision will need to be read in conjunction with (and no doubt subject to) the cost–benefit test outlined in the previous section. A very small recovery-per-class-member may not survive that separate costs–benefit test.

Notably, this CRA preliminary merits criterion is certainly nothing like the US Magnuson-Moss Consumer Product Warranty Act,​[190]​ which required, inter alia, a minimum individual claim of $25; and a class minimum claim of $50,000. Apparently, the provision’s function was ‘to avoid trivial or insignificant actions being brought as class actions in the federal courts.’​[191]​ The Ontario Law Reform Commission was unimpressed, calling the criterion ‘unnecessary and restrictive’.​[192]​ The CRA regime eschewed anything like it too. 

A personal belief in its success

Some preliminary merits criteria in other comparator jurisdictions focus upon the ‘reasonableness’ of the claim, at least on the part of the representative claimant who is bringing it. The CRA regime requires that the collective proceedings claim form should state that ‘the proposed class representative believes that the claims which it is sought to combine in the collective proceedings have a real prospect of success’.​[193]​ 

	On the one hand, this requirement’s subjective limb is somewhat analogous to a requirement that a claim be brought ‘in good faith’. The OLRC required that as a relevant certification criterion,​[194]​ as did the South Australian Law Reform Committee.​[195]​ The former noted that a claim was in good faith if it was not frivolous or vexatious or bound to be unsuccessful.​[196]​ Prof Williams, upon whose earlier proposal​[197]​ the OLRC based its provision, described a class action brought in ‘good faith’, as where the representative claimant ‘is genuinely concerned to secure redress for the class, and the class action is not made for the purposes of vexing the defendant or to coerce him into making a settlement.’​[198]​ On the other hand, although worded as a subjective test, it is likely (and this author agrees the view of another commentator on this point​[199]​) that an objective assessment will be imputed to this criterion, on the basis that the representative’s belief must be based upon reasonable grounds, viz, evidence as to the merits of the claim. The requirement to prove ‘real prospects of success’ of the collective proceedings in which he or she believes will invoke a 'strength of the claim'-type preliminary merits test (discussed previously).

Interestingly, this was the only merits criterion which was not considered by the CAT in Mobility Scooters at all. Hence, the abovementioned subjective-versus-objective question remains for determination on another occasion. 

	The various preliminary merits criteria for an opt-out collective proceedings to be certified, discussed in this section, imbue the CAT with some considerable discretion as to whether or not to permit the claim to proceed in that form. Whilst it has been said that the regime 'transforms procedure from the servant of substantive law into its master' and that 'a residual discretion not to allow meritorious claims to proceed' is undesirable,​[200]​ this author does not agree. The preliminary merits framework is, deliberately, more onerous than the class actions regimes enacted in Australia, Canada and the United States, and properly reflects the caution and pragmatism which has underpinned the law reform of collective redress in the UK. It will be for the CAT to interpret key words and phrases — and the Mobility Scooters judgment has embarked on that process, with more elucidation certainly required in other early cases, in order to establish a body of precedent in relation thereto. This is precisely the sort of process which necessarily occurs with any new statutory regime.

G.   Conclusion

The development of UK class actions law has taken shape over the course of at least two decades. Since Lord Woolf proposed an opt-out regime in 1996, matters have taken an uneven course of fits and starts, culminating in the CRA regime commencing October 2015. Of course, being a sectoral regime, it will affect a great deal of litigation not at all, and some litigation a very great deal. 

	The implementation of the CRA regime has occurred in a landscape of ‘seasoned jurisprudence’ elsewhere. The legislative and judicial insights derived from those other jurisdictions have been invaluable in making drafting choices for the UK regime. As the first certification judgment in Mobility Scooters has aptly demonstrated, that comparative jurisprudence will also be useful when the CAT comes to interpret relevant statutory words and phraseology. That is the very point of a ‘third generation’ class actions statute​[201]​ — the ‘first generation’ enacted in the US,​[202]​ and the ‘second generation’ statutes in Canada and Australia,​[203]​ have provided an enormous body of jurisprudence, much of which was (and will continue to be) very instructive to UK law-makers. Comparative law is, of course, a ‘two-way street’. The different — and deliberate — drafting choices which the legislature has adopted for the UK regime are undoubtedly attributable to specific legal, societal and historical factors arising in this jurisdiction. The very uniqueness of the UK’s legislation is likely to mean that, in turn, its regime will be closely observed by law-makers elsewhere, as cases emerge.

	The unique way in which standing to sue has been drafted in the CRA regime has avoided several conundrums which have occurred elsewhere. The ‘sole’, the ‘exceptional’, the ‘barring’, and the ‘generalist’ provisions have all been eschewed, in favour of an ‘either/or’ provision. The utility of that option has already been demonstrated in Mobility Scooters.

	The various preliminary merits criteria included in the CRA regime will provide considerable threshold tests for the continuation of the class action, depending upon how the CAT decides to interpret them. As the CJC Working Party stated back in 2010,​[204]​ any merits test can result in a ‘mini-trial’ at the certification stage, together with ‘satellite litigation over the exact height of the threshold’. The Working Party split on this issue. The majority considered that less onerous preliminary merits were called for, whilst the minority recommended a panoply of criteria (including a ‘real prospects of success’), because this was ‘a valid means of ensuring that only meritorious cases could proceed, using a specialist form of procedure which could often in and of itself generate large costs.’ Both viewpoints are entirely reasonable, but irreconcilable. In Mobility Scooters, the CAT has indicated that it will take a fairly lenient view of these criteria — something well short of a 'mini-trial' — although more jurisprudence will be required to ultimately form a reliable pattern of interpretation. 
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